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OVERVIEW OF SOME SECURITY  
ASPECTSOF SMART PHONES
Petar Čisar, PhD
University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies, Belgrade
petar.cisar@kpa.edu.rs
Imre Rudas, PhD
Obuda University, Hungary
rudas@uni-obuda.hu
Abstract: Smart phones or mobile phones with advanced capabilities are used by more 
people. Their popularity and relatively weaker security level have made them attractive 
targets for attackers. Mobile phone security in the beginning has not kept pace with 
traditional computer security. Security methods, such as firewalls, antivirus software 
and encryption, were insufficiently represented on mobile phones, and mobile operat-
ing systems were not updated as frequently as those on personal computers. However, 
mobile security nowadays is a rapidly growing field in the security area. With the in-
crease in the number of mobile devices and their applications, the need for mobile se-
curity has increased extremely over the past several years. This paper gives an overview 
of some of the security aspects that must be considered when choosing a particular 
model of a smart phone with a satisfactory level of security: biometrics, encryption, 
hardware-assisted security, sandboxed user data, VPN possibility etc. A special accent 
in the paper is placed on newer types of processors as one of the most important com-
ponents of the mobile device and their security possibilities. A comparative analysis of 
the key technical characteristics of the most commonly used newer processors is also 
given. In addition, the paper also focuses on the use of mobile security software and 
Android browsers, pointing out its numerous useful features.
Keywords: smart phones, security, processor, metrics, mobile security software, An-
droid browser
INTRODUCTION
Smart phones are becoming more popular and numerous users decide to buy a smart 
phone for their mobile communication. They offer more features than classic mobile phones, 
and one of the reasons of their popularity is the ability to expand device capabilities by adding 
new applications. Smart phones have been present in the mobile phone market for a long 
time, but they have gained real popularity with the appearance of iPhone smart phone (Apple) 
and Android operating system (Google).
Android and iOS are the two most widely used operating systems (OS) for smart mobile 
terminal devices. Although these two OSs share some similarities, such as layered architec-
ture, the most important difference is in the type of code. Android is an open source operating 
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system, while iOS is a closed code. Closed nature makes the iOS operating system less flexible 
but less vulnerable.
Every advanced mobile phone, as PCs, is a potential target of attacks. These attacks use 
vulnerability characteristics for smart phones that can originate from their communication 
mode - for example, GSM, short message service (SMS), multimedia messaging service 
(MMS), Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, the worldwide accepted standards for mobile communications. 
There are additionally misuses which are focused on software weaknesses in the web browser 
or operating system. Besides, a few attack types depend on hardware vulnerabilities (electro-
magnetic waveforms, juice jacking, jail-breaking and rooting).
In accordance with the above, in general terms, three models of mobile platform threats 
can be formulated:
Attack with physical access - try to unlock phone, exploit vulnerabilities to bypass locking
System attacks - exploit vulnerabilities in mobile platform using web downloads, mal-
formed data, operating systems etc. 
Application attacks - use malicious application to steal data, misuse system and hijack 
other applications.
Android is considered to be one of the most common mobile operating systems. Its gener-
al security vulnerabilities can be formulated as: open source nature, fragmentation, slow mov-
ing upgrades, JavaScript binding over HTTP vulnerability and third party applications stores.
In the following figure, the degree of threat from malicious mobile malware is illustrated 
and it represents the number of detected malware packages worldwide.
Figure 1. Number of Detected Malicious Installation Packages  
on Mobile DevicesWorldwide (from 4th quarter 2015 to 3rd quarter 2017)1
There are various organizations worldwide focused on improving the mobile security. One 
of them is Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). This is an open community 
dedicated to enabling organizations to develop, purchase, and maintain applications and APIs 
(application programming interface) that can be trusted. The primary aim of the OWASP Top 
10 is to educate developers, designers, architects, managers, and organizations about the con-
sequences of the most common and most important web application security weaknesses. 
The OWASP Mobile Security Project is a centralized resource intended to give developers 
1 Statista, The Statistics Portal, https://www.statista.com/statistics/653680/volume-of-detected-mobile-
malware-packages/
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and security teams the resources they need to build and maintain secure mobile applications. 
Through the project, the goal is to classify mobile security risks and provide developmental 
controls to reduce their impact or likelihood of exploitation.
The OWASP identified and categorized the following top ten mobile risks in 2016:2
Improper Platform Usage (M1) – Misuses of a platform feature or failure to use platform 
security controls is covered in this category. It might include Android intents, platform per-
missions, misuse of TouchID, the Keychain, or some other security control that is a part of 
the mobile operating system. There are several ways that mobile apps can experience this risk.
Insecure Data Usage (M2) - This new category is a combination of M2 + M4 from Mobile 
Top Ten 2014. Insecure data storage and unintended data leakage are covered. 
Insecure Communication (M3) - Poor handshaking, incorrect SSL versions, weak negotia-
tion, clear text communication of sensitive assets are covered.
Insecure Authentication (M4) - Notions of authenticating the end user or bad session man-
agement is captured in this category. This can include: 
?? Failing to identify the user at all when that should be required
?? Failure to maintain the user’s identity when it is required
??Weaknesses in session management 
Insufficient Cryptography (M5) - The code applies cryptography to a sensitive information 
asset. However, the cryptography is insufficient in some way. Note that anything and every-
thing related to TLS or SSL goes in M3. Failing to use cryptography at all, when it should, 
probably belongs to M2. M5 is for issues where cryptography was attempted but it wasn’t 
done correctly.
Insecure Authorization (M6) - Any failures in authorization are to be captured in this cat-
egory (authorization decisions in the client side, forced browsing, etc.). It is distinct from 
authentication issues (device enrolment, user identification, etc.). 
However, an authentication failure appears if the application does not authenticate users 
at all in a situation where it should. In this case, it is not considered an authorization failure.
Client Code Quality (M7) - This was the “Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs”, one of 
our lesser-used categories. This would be the catch-all for code-level implementation prob-
lems in the mobile client. That’s distinct from server-side coding mistakes. This would capture 
things like buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities, and various other code-level mis-
takes where the solution is to rewrite some code that’s running on the mobile device.
Code Tampering (M8) – Binary patching, local resource modification, method hooking, 
method swizzling, and dynamic memory modification are covered in this category. 
Once the application is delivered to the mobile device, the code and data resources are 
resident there. An attacker can either directly modify the code, change the contents of mem-
ory dynamically, change or replace the system APIs that the application uses, or modify the 
application’s data and resources. This can provide the attacker a direct method of subverting 
the intended use of the software for personal or monetary gain. 
Reverse Engineering (M9) – Analysis of the final core binary to determine its source code, 
libraries, algorithms, and other assets is included in this category. Software such as IDA Pro, 
Hopper, otool, and other binary inspection tools give the attacker insight into the inner work-
ings of the application. This may be used to exploit other nascent vulnerabilities in the appli-
cation, as well as revealing information about back end servers, cryptographic constants and 
ciphers, and intellectual property.
2 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2016-Top_10
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Extraneous Functionality (M10) - Often, developers include hidden backdoor function-
ality or other internal development security controls that are not intended to be released into 
a production environment. For example, a developer may accidentally include a password as 
a comment in a hybrid app. Another example includes disabling of 2-factor authentication 
during testing.
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ASPECTS OF SMART PHONES
Android, as one of the most popular operating systems for smart phones (mobile phones 
with advanced capabilities) today, due to its openness of code, carries with it a series of poten-
tial security problems, which can be formulated in several categories (Čisar, 2017):
Open source - Since the entire source code is easily accessible, people with malicious in-
tent may seek the ability to create security issues.
Fragmentation - With hundreds of manufacturers, who all contribute to the development 
of the operating system, viruses and malware of new generations easily exploit the weaknesses 
that are not found in Stock Android. 
Slow moving upgrades - Android users are known for delays in adopting new patches and 
versions or migrating to a new version of the operating system. Using an outdated version of 
the operating system becomes more and more vulnerable to data and identity theft.
JavaScript binding over HTTP - Programmers can accept JavaScript connection method 
as the easiest way to load web content in an Android application, but this can be a source of 
major security problems. By opening the web view with HTTP, it gives the possibility for at-
tackers to completely remove HTTP data or events by remote execution of application codes.
Third party Application Stores - Although this does not have to be a security problem in 
direct connection with Android, it deserves a certain amount of attention. The fact is that 
these stores contain more hidden malware than in the Google Play Store. Although not all 
third-party application stores are risky, it’s still necessary to look carefully at those in which 
the application will be installed (available). The installed application in these stores does not 
necessarily have security threats, but it can create a bad reputation if users for some reason 
are dissatisfied with them.
When we talk about security and privacy aspects of smart phones, there are several differ-
entiating factors which have to be identified:3
?? Biometrics: There are two security directions including fingerprint scanners and 
other biometric unlocking algorithms. To begin with, there is a possibility that if someone’s 
biometric identifiers were stolen, he wouldn’t be able to simply change them as a password, 
making them for all time potential security risk. The second direction of reasoning is that if a 
security approach is less demanding, they’ll probably really utilize it, in which case biometrics 
are better for general security. It depends on the user whether the fingerprint sensor is 
acceptable to him or not, but it is important to emphasize that having such option empowers 
other security-related features (for example, LastPass’ fingerprint login).
?? Encryption: There are two types of encryptions: file-based encryption (FBE) and 
full disc encryption. One of the two types is used by the majority of modern phones. FBE 
allows single files to be locked with different keys and it makes it more effective than full disc 
encryption since it uses only one key to lock the whole disc partition. Phones use the AES 
encryption standard, with 128/256-bit keys to decrypt the data.
3 Gadget Hacks, https://smartphones.gadgethacks.com/how-to/4-best-phones-for-privacy-
security-0176106/
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?? Hardware-Assisted Security: Each phone calls upon the hardware to improve the 
general security of the device. iOS devices use the hardware to assist with encryption whereas 
the Android devices utilize the hardware to store cryptographic keys.
?? Sandboxed User Data: If privacy is one among high issues, a user will need to keep up 
separate areas on their phone — perhaps one for work, and another for personal usage. If so, 
it is important that the data from every user account is completely separated (“sandboxed”) 
and that the Android phones support this feature.
?? Limit Advertisement (Ad) Tracking: Phones that work with Apple and Google services 
preinstalled, use an advertising tracking identifier (ID) to help marketing partners send 
targeted ads. This ID follows the user who uses different applications and services, which is 
problematic from the aspect of privacy. Apple allows restrict applications’ abilities to view 
and use this identifier, while Google merely lets a user reset the ID and opt out of seeing 
personalized ads on Android devices.
?? VPN Possibility: A virtual private network (VPN) allows rerouting internet traffic 
through an external server. Encrypt data traffic for obtaining increased level of security can 
be provided to a user by a VPN service. With Android devices, user can direct all types of 
internet traffic through a VPN. With an iPhone, a user can only use a VPN over Wi-Fi, unless 
they are willing to reset his device and enable “Supervised Mode” to get the VPN working on 
his mobile data connection.
?? Block Internet Access for Applications: If someone does not want applications “phoning 
home,” the ability to block internet access on a per-app basis is a significant advantage. With 
Android, this can be done by setting up a local VPN. With iOS, a user can easily disable 
mobile data access for an app, however, it is not possible to restrict Wi-Fi connectivity.
?? Data Wipe After Failed Login: Some phones have a feature that triggers an automatic 
factory reset when someone attempts to enter user’s PIN or password too many times, if 
enabled. This is very effective when it comes to fending off intruders, as it makes brute-force 
password attacks impossible.
?? Password Management Service: The password management service (LastPass) has 
varying degrees of functionality on different phones. Some of the devices allow user to log 
into the service using his fingerprint, others will auto-populate passwords into applications 
and websites for the user.
?? Provide Security Center Application: If someone considers the security very important, 
it is recommended to have a centralized application that helps handling security needs. For 
example, the DTEK security platform (by BlackBerry) gives user an overview of his phone’s 
actual security level and allows him to easily adjust important security settings.
?? Operating System Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE): The majority of 
modern phones run either iOS or Android. In recent years, both of these operating systems 
have had numerous CVEs discovered, so it is important to keep track of exactly how vulnerable 
they are.
?? Security Patch Timeframe: Apple doesn’t adhere to a specific timeframe with its 
security patches. However, updates are generally issued within a month of security bugs being 
discovered. Android releases security patches monthly and leaves it to the original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) to distribute to their devices. Since the Pixel 2 is a Google device, it will 
get Android security patches first.
?? Bug Prize: Some device manufacturers offer a prize for anyone who can find significant 
weaknesses in their phone’s software, stimulating the process of discovering and closing 
security loopholes (bugs). With a higher bounty, people will generally be more motivated 
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to find these bugs. Some companies invite only trusted bug reporters to earn a bounty while 
others will let anybody report bugs and claim the bounty.
Figure 2. Different Metrics for Ensuring Security and Privacy (BlackBerry KEYone 
(1st column), iPhone X (2nd column), Samsung Galaxy Note 8 (3rd column), 
Google Pixel  (4th column))4
PROCESSORS
The processor is the main part of a smartphone, which has a dominant influence on the 
operating speed. Therefore, it is crucial that it operate at a higher speed. The clock rate and the 
number of cores are not the only factors. They are called system-on-a-chip (SoC). In general, 
a SoC consists of a central processing unit (CPU), graphics processing unit (GPU), modem, 
multimedia processor, security device and signal processor.5
Qualcomm’s Snapdragon 845 system-on-chip is the latest generation processor. Besides 
being powerful, energy-efficient, and optimized for artificial intelligence (AI), it is also highly 
secure. The Snapdragon 845 is the first to feature Qualcomm’s secure processing unit (SPU), 
a new subsystem designed to protect biometrics, data, payment information, and SIM data. 
When someone performs some kind of action (save a file or take a photograph), the system-
4 Gadget Hacks, https://smartphones.gadgethacks.com/how-to/4-best-phones-for-privacy-
security-0176106/
5 AndroidPIT, https://www.androidpit.com/fastest-smartphone-processors
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on-chip’s SPU will generate a unique key. In addition, applications (for instance, WeChat and 
Facebook) can use the SPU to generate keys as needed.6
The SPU is completely isolated from the system. Although it is not a “system master,” 
meaning it cannot access information from other systems or take control of new processes, it 
is able to access information from other systems independently.
It plays a crucial role in biometrics. In future, the manufacturer wants to store biometric 
data inside the SPU, run any necessary authenticator code inside the SPU, and terminate the 
data within the SPU itself. This chip is presented as a safer alternative to secure elements like 
ARM’s TrustZone, which have been exploited before.
Table 1. Newer SoCs comparison7
Snapdragon 845 
(Q1 2018)
Snapdragon 835 
(Q2 2017)
Apple A11 Bion-
ic (Q3 2017)
Kirin 970  
(Q3 2017)
CPU (Central 
Processing Unit) 
Architecture
64-bit 64-bit 64-bit 64-bit
CPU Cores
Octa Core 
4 x 2.8 GHz 
Kryo 385 
4 x 1.7 GHz 
Kryo 385 
X20 LTE mo-
dem
Octa Core CPU 
4 x 2.45 GHz 
Kryo 280 
4 x 1.9 GHz 
Kryo 280 
X16 LTE mo-
dem
Hexa-core (2 Ч 
Monsoon + 4 Ч 
Mistral) Max up 
to 2.34 GHz
4 x Cortex A73 
at 
2.4 GHz 4 x 
Cortex 
A53 at 1.8 GHz
GPU 
(Graphics 
Processing Unit)
Adreno 630 Adreno 540
Apple designed 
custom 3 core(s) 
GPU
Mali G72 MP12 
12-core
RAM
Up to 8 GB dual 
channel 
LPDDR4x
Up to 8 GB dual 
channel 
LPDDR4x
3 GB of LPD-
DR4
Up to 8 GB du-
al-channel 
LPDDR4
Manufacturing 
Technology 10 nm FinFET 10 nm FinFET 10 nm FinFET 10 nm FinFET
NPU (Neural 
Processing Unit)
Hexagon DSP 
2nd 
generation
Hexagon DSP Neural Engine NPU
LTE (Long Term 
Evolution)
Cat 18, up to 
1.2 Gbps
Cat 16, up to 1 
Gbps
Cat 16, up to 1 
Gbps
Cat 18, up to 
1.2 Gbps
Popularity of CPU’s  in modern phone models:
?? BlackBerry KEYone - Qualcomm Snapdragon 660
?? iPhone X - Apple A11, Kirin 970
?? Samsung Galaxy S8 Note - Qualcomm Snapdragon 835
?? Google Pixel 2 - Qualcomm Snapdragon 835
6 Xda-developers, https://www.xda-developers.com/qualcomm-snapdragon-845-secure-processing-
unit/
7 SuggestPhone, https://www.suggestphone.com/blog/snapdragon-835-vs-845-apple-a11-bionic-
comparison
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?? Huawei Mate 10 Pro - Kirin 970
?? HTC U11 - Qualcomm Snapdragon 835
?? Sony Xperia XZ Premium - Qualcomm Snapdragon 835
?? LG V30 - Qualcomm Snapdragon 835
?? OnePlus 5T - Qualcomm Snapdragon 835
CPU SECURITY
Snapdragon 845:8 Includes a hardware isolated subsystem called the Secure Processing 
Unit (SPU). The SPU is an isolated security-focused processor embedded in the system-on-
a-chip. The manufacturer wants to store all that biometric data in the vault-like environment, 
which is similar to what Apple does on its A11 Fusion processor in the iPhone. The Secure 
Enclave Processor has its own microprocessor and encrypted memory and it handles ultra-
sensitive data like Face ID data and decryption keys. The SPU stores similar sensitive data 
(payment information, SIM information and more) and it is kept separate from other 
components to prevent hacking.
Figure 3. Snapdragon 845 Structure
Snapdragon 835:9 Built upon the strength of the Snapdragon security platform, this chip 
is designed to safeguard the entire device from mobile security threats. The mobile security 
framework is engineered to provide multilevel security by combining a hardware-level solu-
tion with next-generation software for robust biometrics security. The newest security com-
ponents include a secure camera, secure token and Smart Protect for latest mobile security 
measures.
MOBILE SECURITY SOFTWARE
This type of software will improve mobile device’s performance by cleaning junk files (an-
alyze and safely remove the junk files that take up storage space), optimizing device memory 
(phone boost - kill off buggy applications that slow down the device and steal memory), pro-
viding antivirus and antimalware protection (keeping the device safe from viruses, trojans, 
8 Digital Trends, https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/qualcomm-snapdragon-845-security/
9 Qualcomm, https://www.qualcomm.com/solutions/mobile-computing/features/security/mobile-
security
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vulnerabilities, spyware and protecting personal information) and managing the installed ap-
plications (battery saver - hibernate background battery draining applications to save power).
On-device protections (services) are: malicious applications (anti-malware protection 
and removal options for downloaded potentially harmful applications), safety net (protec-
tion from network and application-based threats), safe browsing (protection from deceptive 
websites - includes a web filtering feature to block dangerous sites), developer APIs (allows 
third-party applications to use security services), Android device manager (protection for 
lost or stolen devices – anti-theft), smart lock (encourage lock screen adoption by reducing 
friction around device unlock).
The aim of the research carried out by AV-Test (the independent IT-security institute) 
is to directly detect the latest malware, to analyze it by using state-of-the-art methods and 
to inform customers of the top-quality results obtained. All products tested and inspected 
by AV-Test undergo complex test procedures in terms of their performance in the following 
categories:10 
?? protection (protection against malicious Android applications)
?? detection of the latest Android malware in real-time
?? detection of the latest Android malware discovered in the last 4 weeks
?? usability (impact of the security software on the usability of the device)
?? performance: the battery life is not impacted by the application
?? performance: the device is not slowed down by the application during normal usage
?? performance: too much traffic is not generated by the application
?? false warnings during installation and usage of legitimate applications from Google 
Play Store
?? false warnings during installation and usage of legitimate software from third party 
application stores
?? features (further important security features)
?? Anti-Theft (Remote-Lock / Remote-Wipe / Locate): Locate, Lock or Wipe your 
device when it is lost or stolen
?? Call Blocker: Block calls from specific or unknown numbers
?? Message Filter: Filter messages and/or mails for unwanted content
?? Safe Browsing: Protection of malicious websites and/or against phishing
?? Parental Control: Features to control or observe the activity of children on the device
?? Backup: Personal data can be saved to SD-card or cloud storage
?? Encryption: Any kind of encryption is supported (e.g. device encryption, SD-card 
encryption or VPN)
The testing results for January 2018 are given by the figure below.
10 AV-Test, https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/mobile-devices/
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Figure 4. AV-Test results for January 2018
ANDROID BROWSERS
The choice of mobile phone’s web browser affects the overall security of communication. 
There are several desirable security options to consider when choosing and installing an An-
droid browser:
?? Private (incognito) browsing: The ability to browse the web secretly, without data saving 
and syncing across devices. Browsing history and logins are not recorded while using this 
mode. History, cookies and site data are never stored on disk, and never transmitted.
?? Advertisements blocker: The ability to blocks advertisements in web pages, either 
natively or with an extension.
?? Tracking protection: Trackers are used by corporations to gather information (such as 
device information, time, and type of browser) about the user when visiting their website. 
This protection blocks these trackers, disabling features like JavaScript, DOM (Document 
Object Model) storage, and cookies that are used by websites to record this information.
?? Extensions: The ability to add extra features to the browser by installing small programs 
which enhance browsing experiences.
?? Password manager: The ability to store password information to autofill frequently 
visited websites. Privacy protection: Automatically clears all browsing history when the 
application closes.
?? HTTPS everywhere: Enforces SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) security wherever that’s 
possible (encrypts communications with many major websites, making browsing more 
secure).
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?? Fraud prevention: Warns the user when browsing potentially fraudulent or malicious 
websites.
?? Malicious download protection: Scans apk-file downloads for malware, keeping a 
device secure.
CONCLUSION
Based on the various aspects of security shown in the paper, it can be concluded that en-
suring a sufficiently high level of security for mobile phones is a complex task. Namely, it is 
necessary to provide the implementation of a wide range of system, hardware and application 
security methods. In that sense, it is recommended to use mobile devices with newer genera-
tion processors, which incorporate numerous improvements from the security domain. Also, 
the application of adequate and up-to-date mobile security software can significantly raise the 
level of security.
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